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China’s Evolving Economic System:  




How China Became Capitalist, by Ronald Coase and Ning Wang. Houndmills: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. xii + 256 pp. £60.00/US$100.00 (hardcover). 
Capitalism From Below: Markets and Institutional Change in China, by 
Victor Nee and Sonja Opper. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
2012. xviii + 431 pp. US$45.00 (hardcover).
When I was asked to review How China Became Capitalist, co-authored by a 
Nobel Laureate in Economics and University of Chicago Professor, I didn’t hesi-
tate to say yes. Unfortunately, from the preface onwards I suspected that I was 
going to be disappointed. This begins with a reference to Stephen Cheung, who 
called China’s economic transition from a Communist system to capitalism “the 
greatest program for economic reform in history” (p. x, italics added). The book’s 
first contradiction follows immediately thereafter, in what is to become its over-
arching theme: “Cheung’s conclusion is doubtless correct, but what is equally 
extraordinary is that the series of events that led China to become capitalist was 
not a programme and that the final result was entirely unexpected” (p. x, italics 
added). In an endnote, the authors add: 
Terms like “capitalist” and “capitalism” are bound to invite controversy. China to-
day remains committed to socialism, calling itself a “socialist market economy with 
Chinese characteristics”. Some readers in China may protest against our wording 
of the title. That China is still ruled by the Chinese Communist Party will probably 
lead many western readers to challenge us on our choice of title as well. Nonethe-
less, China has transformed over the past three decades from a broken economy 
where the market and entrepreneurship were banned to a vibrant one where mar-
ket forces prevail and private enterprises blossom. Our book explains how this 
happened.
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Invite controversy they have! How could this statement be relegated to an 
endnote in the preface of a book entitled How China became Capitalist? Surely, the 
authors of a book of this title would first define what they meant by “capitalism”, 
before demonstrating that the so-called “socialist market economy with Chinese 
characteristics” had—at some specified point in time—become not only consistent 
with this definition but also inconsistent with “socialism”, the meaning of which 
they would also need to define. Surely they would also provide clear, convincing 
measures of the prevalence of market forces and the blossoming of private en-
terprises across China, given mounting evidence to the contrary. Would not these 
issues be central in a book of which the thesis is that China has already become 
capitalist, and by accident? 
Apparently Ronald Coase and Ning Wang thought not. Chapter 1 describes 
China at the “Death of Mao”, setting the tone with lines such as: “An enterpris-
ing people were quickly reduced to lifeless cogs in the socialist machine” (p. 1). 
The chapter provides a patchy account of the Maoist era, with references to the 
“tragic” adoption of the Soviet model of economic central planning, the “inherent 
anti-populism” of socialism (its “fatal flaw”), the persecution of the intellectuals 
and so on, culminating in the perception that dramatic change was considered 
neces sary by the time of Mao’s death in 1976. Chapter 2 covers the ideological 
shift that occurred in the two years after that, emphasizing the Chinese leader-
ship’s lack of a blueprint for market transformation (which weakly supports the 
thesis that capitalism arrived in China by accident), but also the leadership’s 
pragmatic approach to reform and steadfast commitment to facilitating the 
growth of productive forces by whatever means necessary (which contradicts 
it).
Chapter 3 focuses on the period from 1978 to 1987, and provides a reasonable 
depiction of the changes that occurred “along the margins of the socialist eco-
nomy, where state control was at its weakest” (p. 46). Coase and Wang identify 
four marginal revolutions: in agriculture; rural industrialization; the “individual” 
private economy (spatially concentrated around Wenzhou); and the integration 
of the Special Economic Zones into the global economy (also, obviously, spatially 
concentrated). Their key point is that these marginal revolutions underpinned 
China’s economic success during this period and placed it firmly on the capitalist 
development path, which is a valid argument. 
Rather than proceeding chronologically, Chapter 4 also begins in the early 1980s, 
with disparate sections on the failure of early enterprise reforms, the ideo logical 
dilemmas of the Chinese government, the dominance of Deng Xiaoping and Chen 
Yun in Chinese politics through the 1980s, price reforms, the Tianan men incident 
and more. What Chapter 4 does not do is delve into how the four marginal 
revolutions expanded over time and/or space post-1987, which is what is needed 
to demonstrate how and when the country actually became capitalist. This is 
particularly problematic, given that Yasheng Huang explains how precisely the 
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opposite occurred during the 1990s, and argues that policy reversals have resulted 
in “China’s transition to capitalism” remaining incomplete.1 
Coase and Wang acknowledge this policy reversal in Chapter 5, which begins 
with the wave of political campaigns in the early 1990s against “the fledgling 
private sector as the economic bastion of bourgeois ideology” (p. 107): clearly a 
time during which private enterprises did not blossom. The chapter then mean-
ders towards the conclusion that “capitalism with Chinese characteristics” was 
brought about (and, it seems, is defined) by “the development of a common 
national market, the privatization of state enterprises and the rise of regional 
competition” (p. 152). This odd definition does not accord with Huang’s more apt 
definition of “capitalism with Chinese characteristics” as “a function of  a po litical 
balance between two Chinas—the entrepreneurial, market-driven rural China 
vis-à-vis the state-led urban China”,2 nor with Christopher McNally’s related 
definition of “Sino-capitalism”, nor any other definition that I have come across.3 
Chapter 6 reverts to the late 1970s to explain China’s dual-track transition to 
capitalism—one state-led (and therefore not accidental), and one grass-roots (but 
tolerated by the state and therefore also not accidental). After dismissing the idea 
that China is a form of “authoritarian capitalism” or “state-guided capitalism”, 
the authors conclude: “Readers who have followed our account of how China be-
came capitalist have good reasons to dismiss such a statist interpretation of Chi na’s 
economic reform as self-serving propaganda of  the Chinese Communist Party” 
(p. 175). The chapter goes on to explain how the lack of a free market for ideas in 
China “has become the most restrictive bottleneck in China’s economic and social 
development” (p. 199), although whether this lack of freedom is a defining feature 
of their notion of Chinese capitalism is unclear. As the book draws to a close, I do 
not seem to be alone in my confusion, with the authors stating:
1. Huang devotes Chapter 1 of his book to the question of “Just how capitalist is China?”, and shows 
that the share of the private sector in China’s total economy, when properly measured, remained very small, 
even as late as 2005: Yasheng Huang, Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the State 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 259. (Note: page numbers cited refer to the Kindle version 
of the book). According to this measure, then, China’s economy is not very capitalistic at all.
2. Yasheng Huang, Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics, p. 132.
3. In particular, see the definitions of “entrepreneurial”, “state-led”, “oligarchic” and “big-firm” capitalism, 
and the discussion of how China’s economic system features elements of each of these, in William Baumol, 
Robert Litan and Carl Schramm, Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism, and the Economics of Growth and 
Prosperity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). For definitions of guanxi capitalism and “Sino-
capitalism” (on which more below), see Christopher McNally, “China’s Changing Guanxi Capitalism: Private 
Entrepreneurs Between Leninist Control and Relentless Accumulation”, Business and Politics, Vol. 13, No. 2 
(2011), Article V, and Christopher McNally, “Sino-Capitalism: China’s Re-emergence and the International 
Political Economy”, World Politics, Vol. 64, No. 4 (2012), pp. 741–76; see also McNally’s reflections on 
capitalism in the Chinese context (Christopher McNally, “Reflections on Capitalism and China’s Emergent 
Political Economy”) in Christopher McNally (ed.), China’s Emergent Political Economy: Capitalism in the 
Dragon’s Lair (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), Chapter 2 (pp. 17–35).
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It will take us decades, if not centuries, to fully explain why China became capitalist 
the way it did, resolving all intriguing puzzles. But we must first establish a solid 
understanding of how China became capitalist and ascertain exactly what we have 
to explain before we can possibly venture any causal explanation. (p. 202)
This quote is one of dozens that illustrate how the doubts prompted by the 
preface of this book were realized: it presents a disappointing, although admit-
tedly extremely thought-provoking, account of how China supposedly became 
capitalist. 
Victor Nee and Sonja Opper’s Capitalism From Below: Markets and Institu-
tional Change in  China excels in every way in which the book by Coase and Wang 
does not. Like Coase and Wang, Nee and Opper downplay the role of  the state in 
explaining China’s economic transition, arguing that the emergence and growth 
of the private economy was neither envisioned nor anticipated by China’s poli-
tical élite. They focus on the informal norms and social networks of enterprises 
and individuals, whose actions underpinned bottom-up capitalist insti tutional 
change and enabled enterprises and individuals to thrive in an emerging market 
economy, despite the lack of formal rules safeguarding their property rights and 
the initial disadvantages of  having to function outside the state-owned enterprise 
system. 
The book is beautifully structured and written, making it far easier to summa-
rize than Coase and Wang’s. Chapter 2 presents a simple, clear conceptual frame-
work for an “endogenous multi-level causal model of institutional change”, on 
which the rest of the book builds. Chapter 3 introduces the seven surveyed cities 
that are the focus of the book’s empirical analysis, and presents the survey method-
ology (with the full set of survey questions provided in an appendix). Chapter 4 
focuses on the various institutional innovations and forms of cooperation used by 
credit-constrained peasants-turned-entrepreneurs to start up and expand produc-
tion. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 build on this idea by examining how these entrepreneurs 
minimize the costs of operating outside the state system, relying on various orga-
nizational strategies, marketing networks and industrial clusters, and labor stan-
dards and norms. Chapter 8 examines the capacity of the private sector to in novate, 
expand and move up the value-added production chain, followed by a brief con-
sideration of the role of political connections in Chapter 9, and conclusions in 
Chapter 10. Throughout the book, theory is combined seamlessly with anec-
dotal evidence and survey-based analysis, all placed in historical context to pre- 
sent an extremely cohesive, readable and convincing account of the re-emergence 
of entrepreneurialism in China during the last three decades. 
The Nee–Opper thesis is consistent with the “entrepreneurial, market-driven ru-
ral China” half of Huang’s definition of “capitalism with Chinese characteristics”.4 
4. Yasheng Huang, Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics.
This content downloaded from 150.203.228.177 on Wed, 11 Jun 2014 21:39:40 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
192 • T H E  C H I NA  J O U R NA L ,  No. 70
For Huang, this is without doubt the better part of China’s emerging capitalist 
system, and he argues that the Chinese economy has prospered whenever it has 
been allowed to dominate. Nee and Opper’s book strengthens Huang’s argument, 
and updates it with the use of 2009 survey data. It also provides partial support 
for Coase and Wang’s thesis, in that private enterprises are shown to be “blossom-
ing” in select parts of the country. Importantly, however, the book’s focus on just 
seven cities in the Yangzi Delta leads Nee and Opper to acknowledge: “Clearly, 
our study does not aim to represent China as a whole. As in earlier studies of 
the rise of capitalism in the West, our intention is to study the regional sprouts 
of capitalist production, which may only gradually spread to other regions to 
eventually alter the nature of the entire national economy” (p. 71). Thus a key 
question that emerges from Nee and Opper’s book is whether, when and how this 
form of entrepreneurial capitalism might spread across the country to become 
the dominant form of capitalism in China. 
It is impossible to answer this question without reflecting on the interactions 
between Chinese entrepreneurs and the state. Nee and Opper do this in Chap- 
ter 9. Here they consider the prospects for state capitalism in China, by which 
they mean the co-existence of markets as the main coordinating mechanism in 
the economy and the political hegemony of the Communist Party, and which im-
plies the importance of state–company relations utilizing personal connections 
to acquire economic advantage. They provide evidence that the value of political 
connections is on the decline, concluding: “Markets not only create the incen-
tives for profit making; they also provide the opportunities to decouple from the 
political sphere as producers shift from unproductive rent seeking to productive 
entrepreneurship” (p. 258). This conclusion fits in neatly with their depiction of 
a resilient, innovative and expansionary private sector, and suggests that the au - 
thors see “entrepreneurial” capitalism—one of the “good” forms of capitalism de-
fined by William Baumol, Robert Litan and Carl Schramm,5 in which the state 
plays a fairly minimal role—as the logical end point of China’s capitalist transition.
This end point is far from guaranteed, however. McNally stresses the impor-
tance of political guanxi networks for China’s private entrepreneurs in his ver-
sion of “Sino-capitalism”,6 which embodies a unique combination of “top-down 
state-led development with bottom-up entrepreneurial private capital accumu-
lation”.7 Although his research resonates with Nee and Opper’s in its emphasis on 
informal institutions and social networks, it differs in its focus on private–state 
linkages that enhance entrepreneurs’ chance of success in a state-dominated sys-
tem, thereby sustaining a critical role for the state as well. Recent commentary 
5. William Baumol, Robert Litan and Carl Schramm, Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism, and the Economics 
of Growth and Prosperity.
6. Christopher McNally, “China’s Changing Guanxi Capitalism”, and Christopher McNally, 
“Sino-Capitalism”.
7. Christopher McNally, “Sino-Capitalism”, p. 744.
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on the “renewed concentration of power in the state-controlled segment of the 
economy”8 following the global financial crisis in 2008–09, and on the 145,000 
state-owned enterprises with deep ties to the Communist Party élite,9 indicate 
that the top-down vs. bottom-up “competition” in China’s economic transition 
is far from over. These and other complex interactions between market and state 
will critically shape China’s multifaceted and ever-evolving economic system, re-
gardless of the name that is used to describe it. 
According to Ezra Vogel,10 Deng Xiaoping never believed that he was experi-
menting with capitalism without using its name, despite his critics who claimed 
the contrary. Instead, Deng saw single-Party rule, public ownership of the land, a 
dominant role for state ownership and state economic planning as essential com-
ponents of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, a phrase he is credited with 
adopting.11 In his keynote report at the 18th National Party Congress in November 
2012, outgoing President Hu Jintao stated that “the path of socialism with Chi-
nese characteristics, the system of theories of socialism with Chinese character-
istics and the socialist system with Chinese characteristics are the fundamental 
accomplishments made by the Party and people in the course of arduous strug-
gle over the past 90-plus years”.12 It is highly unlikely that the new generation of 
leaders under President Xi Jinping will deviate from this long-established Party 
line, particularly given that Deng’s checklist can still be used to characterize the 
Chinese economy today. As an early indication of this, in Xi Jinping’s opening 
address at the Congress he not only reiterated the points made by Hu Jintao but 
also referred to “socialism with Chinese characteristics” 75 times.13
Despite maintaining throughout his life that China was firmly on a socialist 
path, Deng also expressed the view that it was unnecessary to ask if something 
was called “capitalism” or “socialism”.14 More than two decades later, I would ar-
gue to the contrary. There is a glaring gap between the official Chinese perception 
of a deliberate transition towards “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, at one 
extreme, and that of an accidental transition towards entrepreneurial capitalism, 
8. Stephen Roach, “China Changes Leaders: Reform and Open Up”, New York Times (8 November 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/09/opinion/china-should-reform-and-open-up.html (accessed  
14 November 2012).
9. Keith Bradsher, “China’s Grip on Economy Will Challenge New Leaders”, New York Times at http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2012/11/10/world/asia/state-enterprises-pose-test-for-chinas-new-leaders.html 
?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed 14 November 2012).
10. Ezra Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 400.
11. Ezra Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, p. 684.
12. See “Hu: China to Follow Path of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”, http://news.xinhuanet.com 
/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/17/c_131981259.htm (accessed 30 November 2012).
13. See “Jinjin weirao jianchi he fazhan Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi” (Uphold and Develop Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics), http://news.xinhuanet.com/2012-11/19/c_123967017.htm (accessed 30 November 
2012). 
14. Ezra Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, p. 685.
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at the other. This gap calls for ongoing efforts to clarify the nature of China’s 
economic system, not only at the margins or in the Yangzi River Delta but in 
urban China, inland China and Party-state-controlled China as well. Otherwise, 
we may never truly understand what Ronald Coase and Ning Wang rightly call 
the great story of our time.
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